








Feminist	bioethics	 is	 a	field	 of	 thought	 that,	
thanks	 to	 its	 capacity	 to	 call	 in	 question,	




deserving	 of	 audience	 attention	when	 it	 has	
something  new  to  say.  For  this  and  other  
reasons,	Mary	C.	Rawlinson’s	book	ambigu-
ously titled Just Life is a recommended philo-
sophical treat.
A	 few	 words	 about	 feminist	 bioethics.	 Al-
though	 feminist	 perspectives	 on	 certain	
bioethical	 topics	 appeared	 even	 earlier,	 the	




inist Perspectives in Medical Ethics edited by 
Helen	B.	Holmes	and	Laura	M.	Purdy,	and	No 







Stanford  Encyclopedia  of  Philosophy	 (Win-





tablished,	 holding	 regular	 conferences	 since	
1996,	and	has	been	running	the	International 
Journal of Feminist Approaches to Bioethics 
(IJFAB)	since	1997.
Feminist  bioethics  is  not  only  a  specialised  
supplement	 to	 the	 discipline	 from	which	 it	
originated	 but	 often	 differs	 from	 the	 latter	
in	its	approach,	methodology,	in	placing	spe-
cific	emphasis	on	certain	topics	and,	perhaps	
most	 interestingly,	 in	 accentuated	 criticism	
of	 its	 origins.	 Moreover,	 a	 view	 from	 the	
margins	 is	one	of	 the	key	 features	of	 femi-
nist	bioethics,	which	is	why	in	the	key	2010	
anthology Feminist Bioethics: At the Center, 
On the Margins,	Petya	Fitzpatrick	and	Jackie	
Leach  Scully  argued  that  there  are  reasons  
why  mainstreamisation  and  popularisation  
of	feminist	bioethics	can	be	considered	more	
of	 a	 disadvantage	 than	 an	 advantage.	 Al-
though	 the	 consequences	 of	marginal	 posi-
tion	and	lack	of	exposure	meant	treating	fem-
inist  bioethics  as  a  token or  mistaking it  in  
superficial	 interpretations	 for	 “care	 ethics”,	





Leach	 Scully,	 Laurel	 E.	 Baldwin-Ragaven,	
Petya	Fitzpatrick	 (eds.),	Feminist Bioethics. 
At the Centre, On the Margins,	 The	 Johns	
Hopkins	 University	 Press,	 Baltimore	 2016,	
pp.	1–9,	p.	6).
The	 particular	 approach	 of	 feminist	 bioeth-
ics	 introduces	several	additional	 factors	 into	









derstanding,	 feminist	bioethicists	claim,	 it	 is	
impossible	 to	contextualise	and/or	deal	with	
bioethical	 problems.	 Specific	 bioethical	 is-
sues	addressed	by	feminist	bioethics	concern	
women’s	 health,	 reproductive	 medicine	 and	
technology,	 family	 and	 social	 care,	 public	
health,	disability,	mental	health,	etc.	Simulta-
neously,	 the	 importance	 of	 lived	 experience	
versus	 abstract	 ethical	 universals,	 collective	
responsibility versus individual guilt and so-
cial	change	versus	superficial	 and	short-term	
policy	solutions	comes	to	the	fore.
Such	 an	 approach	 often	 directs	 the	 femi-
nist-bioethical	 critique	 towards,	 as	 already	
mentioned,	 bioethics	 as	 such,	 looking	 at	
some	 aspects	 of	 it,	 especially	 contemporary	
institutionalisation,	in	the	negative	context	of	




and	 an	 Affiliated	 Faculty	 in	 Comparative	
Literature	and	Women’s	and	Gender	Studies	
at	Stony	Brook	University	in	New	York,	be-
gins  her  study. Just  life  is  her  latest  book in  
which  Rawlinson  builds  on  the  themes  and  
issues  outlined  in  the  books  she  previously  
(co)edited, Labor and Global Justice (2014), 
Global Food, Global Justice (2015),	and The 
Routledge Handbook of Food Ethics (2016),	
concerning	 food	 and	work	 ethics,	medicine,	
global	justice,	and	bioethics	in	general.	In	it,	
she  also  re-enters  into  a  dialogue  with  two  
famous	 philosophers	 on	 whose	 intellectual	
foundations	 she	 builds	 her	 feminist	 ethics	
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–	 Luce	 Irigaray	 and	 Michel	 Foucault.	 The	
feminist	 ethics	 in	 question	 is	 based	 on	 the	
advocacy	of	 the	middle	ground	between	ac-
cepting the traditional  idea of  universal  (de-
fined	 as	 “one	 set	 of	 forms	 and	 laws	 for	 the	












for	 all	 not	 only	 rests	 on	 the	 exclusion	 of	 women	
and	others	 from	the	field	 of	evidence,	 their	differ-
ences	rendered	irrelevant	or	a	perversion,	but	it	also	




This turn has its clear phenomenological con-
sequences	in	the	form	of	advocacy	of	replac-
ing classical phenomenology with the critical 
one:









Rawlinson,	 therefore,	 does	 not	 advocate	
the	rejection	of	 the	universal	as	a	whole	but	





one	 is	 born	 of	 a	woman,	 that	 everyone	 eats	
other  living  beings  and  everyone  has  a  duty  
of	gratitude	and	responsibility	towards	those	
who preceded  them and  who participated  in  
their development and survival.
Such ethics gets its natural continuation in the 
ethics  of  collaboration	 which	 is	 focused	 on	
“building	 solidarities	 in	 the	 imagination	 of	
a	new	future”	(P.	XXI).	As	obstacles	to	such	
ethics,	 the	 author	 chooses	 hardheadedness 






Rousseau,	 and	 Hegel,	 concluding	 that	 the	
existing	 axioms	 of	 political	 philosophy	 re-
garding	the	discontinuity	of	natural	and	civic	
life,	 the	 belief	 in	 the	 inherently	 violent	 na-
ture	of	man,	the	transformation	of	might	into	
right,	 the	 inevitability	 of	 social	 inequalities,	
and	 the	 status	 of	women	 as	 property,	 invis-





“Abstract	 rights	 cannot	 be	 disentangled	 from	 the	
right	to	property,	nor	from	the	norms	of	sexual	and	
racial	 identity	 that	 serve	hierarchies	of	power	and	
wealth.	The	discourse	of	rights	is	complicit	with	bi-
opower,	with	 the	 institutions,	 codes,	 and	practices	
that	enforce	sexual	propriety	and	maximise	the	pro-
ductivity	of	generative	bodies.”	(P.	48.)
Continuing	 Foucault’s	 concept	 of	 biopower,	




the	 examples	 of	 surrogacy,	 the	 productivity	
of	 labour,	masturbation,	prostitution	and	sex	
trafficking.	 For	 her,	 the	 introduction	 of	 the	
concept	of	biopower	 in	bioethical	 issues	en-
ables	 the	 development	 of	 awareness	 of	 the	
ways	a	narrow	set	of	cultural	possibilities	in-
herently limits individual choices.
In	 the	 second	 section,	 “Refiguring	 Ethics”,	
Rawlinson	extends	her	critique	of	the	capital-
isation	of	bodies	to	the	capitalisation	of	rela-
tionships.  Determining the classical  political  
philosophers’	understanding	of	 interpersonal	
and  non-human  relationships  as  being  tradi-
tionally	 reduced	 to	 the	 logic	 of	 capital	 and	
corporate	 interests,	 with	 the	 oedipal	 family	
at	 the	 centre	 of	 ethics	 and	 politics,	 the	 au-
thor  delves  into  two  ancient  literary  stories  




tigone  as  one  who  advocated  a  patriarchal  
division	of	labour	and	sacrificed	herself	in	the	
name	of	abstract	principles,	Rawlinson	inter-
prets Sophocles’ tragedy in an alternative way 





not	 only	 the	 glorification	 of	 the	 philosophi-
cally  neglected  connection  between  mother  
and	daughter	but	also	the	nature	of	this	rela-
tionship	based	on	cooperation,	solidarity	and	
generativity. Applying these principles to her 
ethics	of	life,	the	author	concludes:
“An	 ethics	 of	 life	 serves	 the	 elemental	 conditions	
of	life	and	the	wild	profusion	of	differentiated	be-









indigenous	 farmers,	 sustainable	 farming	and	
biodiversity	 with	 modern	 agribusiness,	 she	
cautions	of	the	ethical	dimension	of	food	and	
the	fact	that	eating	is	not	just	a	matter	of	in-
dividual choice since it depends on structural 
and historical determinants surrounding it (p. 
136).	 This	 is	 particularly	 pronounced	 in	 re-
lation	to	the	global	obesity	epidemic,	whose	
analyses	 too	 often	 boil	 down	 to	 issues	 of	
individual  responsibility  while  ignoring  the  
broader social context associated with pover-
ty,	state	paternalism	and	the	economic	gains	
accompanying	 the	 unhealthy	 food	 industry.	
Discussing	food	ethics,	the	author	concludes:
“What	 and	how	we	eat	determines	our	 relation	 to	
other	 animals,	 the	 forms	of	 social	 life,	 the	gender	




Her  excerpt  on  eating  as  an  ethical  issue  is  
particularly  interesting  concerning  the  re-
sponsibility	 a	 person	 has	 for	 not	 only	 con-
suming	food	but	also	for	growing	and	produc-
ing it. Responsible eating implies knowledge 
about	the	origin	of	food	as	well	as	the	effort	
invested	 in	 its	 production.	 Ignorance	 of	 the	
latter	causes	disinterest	in	the	suffering	of	ani-
mals	in	the	meat	industry	and	the	suffering	of	
nature as a whole exposed to the aggression 
of	agribusiness.	
Under	the	auspices	of	Leibniz’s	remark	how	
everything is connected to everything else (p. 
138),	 and	 following	 Vandana	 Shiva’s	 envi-
ronmental	 theory,	 Rawlinson	 concludes	 that	
agribusiness	 threatens	 the	 Earth,	 disrespects	
the	knowledge	and	work	of	women	and	small	
non-industrial	farmers,	destroys	the	specific-
ity	 of	 indigenous	 and	 diverse	 cultures,	 and	
produces malbouffe,	 tasteless	 food	 of	 poor	
quality.
The	above	is	naturally	followed	by	a	part	in	
which  the  author  problematises  global  ineq-
uity  and  its  connection  with  the  invisibility  
of	 labour	 and	 ignorance	 and	 indifference	 of	
consumers.	The	invisibility	of	labour	is	a	di-
rect	consequence	of	global	corporations’	po-
litical  strategies  aimed  at  hiding  its  abusive  
and	 exploitative	nature.	Here,	 as	 in	 the	pre-
vious	chapters,	Rawlinson	emerges	as	a	vocal	
critic	of	globalisation	processes	as	those	that	





part	 as	 visible,	 publicly	 recognised,	 non-de-
meaning	and	life	sustaining	labour.
In	 “Sovereign	 Bodies”,	 the	 fourth	 and	 final	
part	 of	 the	 book,	 the	 author	 presents	 all	 the	
main	 points	 from	 the	 previous	 parts.	 Here,	
like	 her	 intellectual	 teachers,	 she	 calls	 for	
“shattering	 our	 current	 structures”	while	 re-
calling	the	task	of	philosophy	“to	create	a	new	
culture	 of	 possibilities”	 (p.	 192)	 since	 “the	
aim	of	a	livable	future	calls	for	collaborations	
that  can  produce  new solidarities  based  nei-
ther	on	the	fiction	of	a	generic	subject	nor	on	
the	politics	of	identity”	(p.	187).
Mary C. Rawlinson’s Just Life  is an interest-
ing  and  mostly  well-argued  book  that  repre-
sents	 a	 relevant	 contribution	 to	 the	 field	 of	
feminist	 bioethics.	 It	 presents	 a	 comprehen-
sive	feminist	theory	that,	as	such,	significant-








difference	 is	based	on.	 In	her	 critique	of	 the	
book,	 Ellie	 Anderson	 rightly	 observes	 that	
Rawlinson is inconsistent in deriving the no-
tion	 of	 generativity	 which	 she	 occasionally	








Simultaneously,	 the	 question	 arises	 as	 to	
whether	 the	 problem	of	 universals	 has	 been	
solved	by	introducing	two	instead	of	one	uni-







many	of	 the	 traits	 that	Rawlinson	assigns	 to	
the	female	sex,	women	that	are	closer	in	na-
ture	to	Antigone	than	Ismene	or	Demeter,	and	
who	consciously	work	 for	 patriarchy	 and	 to	
the	detriment	of	other	women	and	their	needs.	
Another  problem  that  can  be  noticed  is  the  
vagueness	 of	 the	 described	 ethics	 of	 life	 as	
such.	The	 question	 of	 how	 it	 works	 and	 its	
applicability on a global level remains open. 
Also  unclear  is  how  it  survives  in  existing  
economic	systems	and	the	assumptions	of	its	
functioning	 in	 the	event	of	 their	 collapse.	 If	
the	 author	 advocates	 the	 latter,	 if	 she	 advo-
cates	 for	 the	necessity	of	demolishing	exist-
ing	systems,	it	remains	to	be	seen	what	exact-
ly the proposed alternatives are and how they 
can be realised.
Ana Maskalan
